Detalles de la obra

Persson, Torsten, ed.; Tabellini, Guido, ed.
Pie de imprenta:
Cambridge: MIT, c1994
Descripción física:
v.2, vi, 465 p. grafs. 23 x 15 cm.
Contiene: Introduction.- I. Elections and policy cycles. 1. Incumbent performance and electoral control. 2. Equilibrium political budget cycles. 3. Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game. 4. Political cycles in OECD economies.- II. Public debt and political instability. 5. Why a stubborn conservative would a deficit: policy with time-inconsistent preferences. 6. Voting on the budget deficit. 7. Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries.- III. Redistribution. 8. A rational theory of the size of government. 9. Growth, distribution, and politics. 10. The politics of intergenerational redistribution. 11. The redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting. 12. Mobility and redistribution. 13. The political economy of benefits and costs: a neoclassical approach to distributive politics.- IV. Economic reform and the status quo. 14. Resistance to reform: status quo bias in the presence of individual-specific uncertainty. 15. Why are stabilizations delayed? 16. Economic reform and dynamic political constraints.-
Referencias bibliográficas:
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Información adicional:
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Monetary and fiscal policy. 2 vol..
Ubicación física:
339.5 / PERc v.2
Tipo de material:
[Material Impreso]