Detalles de la obra

Persson, Torsten, ed.; Tabellini, Guido, ed.
Pie de imprenta:
Cambridge: MIT, c1994
Descripción física:
v.1, vi, 479 p. ; 23 x 15 cm.
Contiene: I. Introduction.- 1. Rather than disdcretion: the inconsistency of optimal plans. 2.- Dynamic inconsistency, cooperation, and the benevolent dissembling government. 3.- On the time consistency of optimal policy in a monetary economy.- II. Reputation. 4.- Rules, discretion, and reputation in a model of monetary policy. 5.- Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information. Sustainable plans. 7.- Social contracts as assets: a possible solution to the time consistency problem. 8.- Sovereign debt: is to forgive to forget?.- III. Delegation. 9. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target.- 10. The advantage of tying one's hands: EMS discipline and central bank credibility. 11. The European Central Bank: reshaping monetary politics in Europe. 12. Designing institutions for monetary stability. 13. Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England.- IV. Government financial structure. 14. Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital. 15. Time consistency of fiscal and monetary policy. 16. Why do we have nominal government debt?. 17. On the flexibility of monetary policy: the case of the optimal inflation tax. 18. Servicing the public debt: the role of expectations.-
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Monetary and fiscal policy. 2 vol..
Ubicación física:
339.5 / PERc v.1
Tipo de material:
[Material Impreso]